In-depth research. Perceptive insights.
In-depth research. Perceptive insights.
Monday, June 5, 2023
Tan Meng Wah
In-depth research. Perceptive insights.
Home / Economics & Business / Part 1: China's Plan to be the Leading Manufacturing Power & the World's Responses to it.
PREVIOUS | NEXT
1.06 Responses of Foreign Corporations and Governments to China’s MIC2025
2 August 2018. Last Updated 18 December, 2018.
Opportunities and Challenges of MIC2025 to Foreign Corporations
For foreign MNCs in high tech industries, MIC presents both immense opportunities and great challenges.
In terms of opportunities, given the greater investment and attention to the ten key industries, MNCs that align themselves with these sectors and the general goals of this plan can benefit from its focus. Already, MIC2025 is starting to create a boom in demand for smart manufacturing products like industrial robots, smart sensors, wireless sensor networks and radio frequency identification chips which Chinese suppliers are not able to provide at their current technological level. In the short term, this spike in demand creates highly attractive business opportunities for many foreign enterprises. There may even be opportunities for Chinese companies and foreign MNCs to collaborate. In May 2018, for example, Qualcomm and Baidu announced that they will work together to use the Qualcomm Artificial Intelligence (AI) Engine to drive conversion and application of Baidu PaddlePaddle open-source deep learning framework models on Qualcomm Snapdragon mobile platforms.
The situation for the long term, however, is less encouraging. In drafting the MIC2025, the Chinese government set clear goals to make Chinese companies more competitive across the board, to localize production of components and final products, to conduct predatory acquisition of foreign technologies, and to have Chinese firms move up the value-added chain in production and innovation networks, and to achieve much greater international brand recognition. MIC2025 thus represents a frontal challenge to advanced manufacturing in the US, Europe, and East Asia and the endeavour will eventually be a zero-sum one. When China emerges to become a strong competitor, the gains of Chinese high-tech firms will surely be losses to the foreign firms.
The foreign high-tech companies are not worried of the competition per se. Their qualm is more of the unfair competition as a result of Chinese government active interventions.
While Chinese high-tech companies enjoy massive state backing, their foreign competitors in China face a whole set of barriers to market access and obstacles to their business activities: the closing of the market for information technology, the exclusion from local subsidy schemes, the requirement to enter into joint ventures for access to the Chinese market as part of the tactics to force them to transfer intellectual property such as industrial designs and patents, the low level of data security, and the intensive collection of digital data by the Chinese state.
As China’s own smart manufacturing capabilities mature and more domestic companies seek global dominance in technology and trade, it is likely that the Chinese state will further step up its discriminatory practices and restrictions of market access in the field of smart manufacturing to protect these asipring domestic companies from foreign competition.
One of the most contentious parts of the MIC2025 is how the country wants to meet Chinese demand with Chinese products. The two main approaches — requiring that a large part of a product’s value be created in China or setting a specific market share for domestic players — are strictly prohibited by the World Trade Organization. Such rules also have market-moving consequences. Chinese regulators made a rule in 2005 requiring that wind turbines sold in China be made up largely of local components. The requirement prompted many of the world’s big wind turbine manufacturers to move factories to China and transfer their latest technology to domestic suppliers. Although Beijing removed the policy four years later after protests by the United States, the competitive damage was done, with Chinese companies gaining significant scale and expertise. China has dominated production of the world’s wind turbines ever since, with 42% of the market last year, according to the Global Wind Energy Council.
Losing Business and Fear over Risk of OverCapacity
Already, there are reports that, in part because of the ‘unofficial’ targets outlined in the Green Book, foreign companies in priority industries including medical devices and advanced agricultural equipment may already be losing business. The US-China Business Council in Beijing, for example, reported that more foreign companies are being excluded from certain Chinese domestic government procurement processes or tenders.
There are also worries that the Chinese government’s push to bolster the country’s manufacturing strength may lead to a new round of overcapacity underpinned by Chinese businesses’ belief that the economy of scale would eventually allow them to recoup the investments. That could repeat the history, on an even larger scale, of industries from steel to solar power and wind power that previously were swamped by Chinese competitors backed by government subsidies and cheap funding from state banks. The overcapacity would create massive waste across the system.
Foreign Governments’ Responses to MIC2025
As pointed out by Stephen Roach, former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, China is not alone in supporting its industries. Industrial policy was central to Japan’s rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s and the Made in China 2025 plan itself draws heavily from Germany’s "Industry 4.0 Plan" adopted in 2013. In the US, breakthroughs in semiconductors, nuclear power, imaging technology and others were all aided by industrial policy.
In principle, foreign governments therefore have good reasons to welcome China’s quest for increased innovation capacity. It could even bring about a mutually beneficial deepening of economic, technological as well as political cooperation between China and its economic partners in Europe and the United States.
However, foreign governments' optimism is underpinned by the premise that China abides by the principles and rules of open markets and fair competition which critics say China is not.
Because of MIC2025’s explicit goals for Chinese industries to overtake those of the developed economies, the grand plan is raising concerns among governments especially in countries such as South Korea, Germany, Japan, Ireland where high-tech industries contribute a large share of economic growth. In 2014, for example, China ended Japan’s dominance of Asia’s high-technology exports, accounting for 44% of shipments of high-tech goods such as medical instruments, aircraft and telecommunications equipment that year – up from 9.4% in 2000.
MIC2025 is thus not only a reflection that China is becoming less complementary to the developed economies and more directly competitive. It also confirms their suspicion that China is not looking for a 'win-win' in trade relations as the Chinese government often insists. If successful, Made in China 2025 could accelerate the erosion of industrial countries’ current technological leadership across industrial sectors and “do for high-tech manufacturing what China did to low-cost manufacturing in the preceding two decades: vacuuming up a huge portion of global production and concentrating it in mainland China”.
Vulnerability of select industrial countries to Made in China 2025
Critics, in particular, pointed out that China’s setting of quotas for self-sufficiency constitutes a violation of WTO rules against technology substitution. The supply chains for hi-tech products usually span across many borders, with highly specialized components often produced in one country and modified or assembled somewhere else. Rather than abiding by the free market and rule-based trade, China is intent on subsuming the entire global hi-tech supply chain through subsidizing domestic industry and mercantilist industrial policies. Semi-official documents lay out even more specific quotas for Chinese manufacturers. In its defence, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) insists these targets are not official policy. A report from the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, however, argues that officials are using internal or semi-official documents to communicate targets to Chinese enterprises in order not to openly violate WTO rules.
Increasingly, foreign governments are viewing Chinese investments, especially those intent on taking over firms with proprietary technologies, as challenges and threats. By itself, merger and acquisitions activities between companies are common and are therefore neither surprising nor objectionable. In the case of China, however, critics are quick to point out that technology acquisitions are partly supported and guided by the state through highly opaque investor networks. This explains why the recent $146-billion (€122-billion) bid by Singapore-controlled Broadcom to take over US chip giant Qualcomm was blocked by US President Donald Trump on the ground that US national security interests would be threatened by such a large scale technology transfer to Asia even though Broadcom, on the book, is not China-owned.
Because of Beijing’s involvements, Chinese high-tech investments are regarded as not purely business transaction. The crux of the issue is not whether the state involvement undermines the principles of fair competition. Rather, the fear of foreign governments is that China’s state-led economic system is exploiting the openness of market economies in Europe and the US to systematically acquire cutting-edge technology and generate large-scale technology transfer.
In April 2018, the Germany’s head of domestic intelligence urged vigilance about increased moves by Chinese companies investing in and acquiring high-technology German companies, warning the loss of key technologies could harm the German economy. He said intelligence officials had been initially puzzled by a sharp drop in Chinese cyber espionage activities about two years ago, but then realised that Beijing was simply exploiting the openness of market economies in Europe and the US to gain access to German know-how legally.
The warning came amid German economy ministry review of a Chinese bid for aerospace supplier Cotesa, a move which could lead to Berlin blocking the sale. Early in 2016, concerns were raised over possible loss of sensitive technology when Chinese household appliance manufacturer Midea acquired a 76.4% stake in KUKA, a German industrial robot powerhouse. The sale went through on the agreement that KUKA would not have to share any of its intellectual property or sensitive customer data with Midea and that KUKA’s leadership would run independent without interference from the Chinese side. Moreover, the company’s headquarter would remain in Germany and all of its 12,300 jobs are guaranteed to be preserved. However, the agreement would stand only until 2023.
To protect sensitive technologies from falling into “wrong” hands, the European Union is reportedly working to complete a new screening mechanism to better control Chinese and other foreign takeovers of sensitive technologies by the end of the year.
In the US, the Obama administration had spent years pressuring Beijing to rein in illegal commercial cyber espionage. It is only now that the US is beginning to grapple with the repercussions of Chinese investment and technology transfer agreements which are legal. Because the U.S. economy is open, foreign investors, including those from China, are able to invest in the newest and most relevant technologies gaining experience with those technologies at the same rate as the US does.
Currently, the primary tool the government has to block or mitigate foreign investment is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). However, since CFIUS reviews specific deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than systematic assessments of acquisitions or acquirers, it will only look into deals that involve a controlling interest by foreign investors. CFIUS is only partially effective in protecting national security since its jurisdiction is limited.
China invested some $64 billion in the US between 1990 and 2015 but in 2016 alone, Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) amounted to $45.6 billion, triple that of 2015. As of end of 2016, the majority of the cumulative Chinese FDI of $109 billion went to real estate and hospitality industries, information and communications technology, as well as entertainment and financial services. One area that has got alarm bells ringing in recent years though is Chinese venture capital funding in new US startups working on early-stage technologies that would be foundational to future innovations: artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, augmented/virtual reality, robotics and blockchain technology. Between 2015 and 2017, Chinese participation in venture-backed startups reached a record level of 10-16% of all venture deals, up from 6% during 2010-2015. Potentially such investments could lead to transfer of new technologies that could, over the long term, accelerate growth of the Chinese economy at the expense of the US’.
Moreover, some of these dual-use technologies are of interest to the US Defense Department to create the Third Offset strategy. Losing them to China would constitute a serious threat to national security. This has struck the raw nerve of American policymakers who were alarmed by how quickly China has managed to modernize its military in recent years, supposedly by stealing technologies from the US, including through cyber theft and industrial espionage. According to the US Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), cost of intellectual property stolen by China has been estimated at $300 billion per year.
[What is Third Offset Strategy? US military superiority since World War II has relied on both US economic scale and technological superiority. US technological pre-eminence enabled the series of offset strategies which included being first with nuclear weapons (the First Offset) and the electronics-enabled weapons of night vision, laser-guided bombs, stealth and jamming technologies as well as spaced-based military communications and navigation enabling the U.S. to dominate the battlefield (the Second Offset). Countries like Russia and China have caught up with US in terms of military technology to nullify advantages the US military has based on the two offset strategies. US is currently working on its Third Offset strategy which would be built on the early-stage technologies China is reportedly eyeing via their VC funding in the US startups.]
The Sino-US Trade War: More about Technology than about Trade
The US has left little doubt that the ongoing trade war is really more about technology than about trade. The USTR Section 301 report released in March 2018 cites MIC2025 a full 116 times. In contrast, China's Cybersecurity Law, which has been a perennial headache for many U.S. multinationals, is only mentioned 13 times. Of course the report also presents a searing indictment of China’s disregard for intellectual property, discrimination against foreign firms, and use of preferential industrial policies to unfairly bolster Chinese firms but the real beef was about MIC2025. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Finance, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer wanted all the 10 high-tech industries listed in MIC2025 to be targeted for possible tariffs, asserting that “These are things that if China dominates the world, it's bad for America.”
Trump objective for the Sino-US trade war is therefore more about maintaining the US long-term technological edge (i.e. preventing China from unfairly acquiring core US technologies) than about addressing the trade imbalance (i.e. having China buy more US goods). The US is not alone in wanting to face up to China. Many countries actually share Trump's desire to combat Chinese hi-tech mercantilism even though they were furious with Trump blanket tariffs against them.
European countries, for example, are quietly hoping to benefit indirectly from the Trump’s protectionist agenda. A severely strained trade relation between US and China, for example, will not only potentially improve Europe’s negotiation position with China but also result in diversion of China’s trade and investments from the US to the Europe.
The Trump administration is not just imposing tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. It is also targeting Chinese tech companies. In April 2018, the US slapped a seven-year ban on ZTE Corp.’s purchase of components from American suppliers on the ground that ZTE ignored its pledges to resolve a sanctions dispute. The ban threatened the survival of China’s No. 2 telecommunications gear-maker. Besides ZTE, the US Justice Department is also said to be investigating whether another Chinese tech giant, Huawei Technologies Co., violated sanctions.
However, despite Washington's attempt to disrupt China’s effort, experts say in the long run it would be difficult to stop Beijing from emerging as a leader in a number of key industrial sectors.
In the short term, though, there is no question that Trump’s actions are causing pain and have injected uncertainty into the Chinese economy. Imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports to the US may induce some MNCs to relocate their manufacturing operations out of China but at the same time, Chinese retaliatory measures on US made products may attract investments to China. It is unclear what the net effect would be over the longer term for China. What can be certain is that the trade war will in the end result in rearrangements in the international value chains of MNCs, accelerating a process which in any case was already underway for some industries because of China’s rising costs.
In response to Trump’s charges, President Xi Jinping vows a 'new phase' of opening China's economy. At the Boao Forum for Asia (博鳌亚洲论坛) in April 2018 he announced that China would raise foreign equity limits in securities, insurers and banks; ease restrictions on foreign ownership in manufacturing (ships, aircraft and autos); lower tariffs for autos and other products; and empower a new state agency to enforce the legal intellectual property of foreign firms.
However, hoping that China will drop its MIC2025 agenda is probably more of a long shot. China will adjust some of its unfair practices but not change its course to upgrade update its industries. In the long run it will still be difficult to stop China from emerging as a leader in a number of key industrial sectors given China’s fundamental strengths, including its deep pocket, first-rate physical infrastructure, huge domestic market, and a pool of hardworking and increasingly well-educated work force. Most of all, China has an exceeding tight-knitted governance structure highly effective in moving Chinese companies in a concerted manner based on state guidance once a direction is set for the overall economy.
For the US, the benefits of the trade war, if it persists, are also not clear cut, not to mention also the collateral damage on the international free trade regime and the global economy. To begin with, it has been pointed out that raising tariffs risks undermining, rather than boosting, US manufacturing. In the aircraft industry, for example, the US imports parts to manufacture aircraft which are then exported to China and other foreign buyers. A proposed 25% tariff on “high-tech” imports from China, including aircraft and parts, will harm the US aircraft industry by increasing the cost of inputs and making Boeing’s products less competitive compared to its European rival, Airbus. The same story goes for US manufacturers across a range of high-tech sectors. And if China slaps retaliatory tariffs on US goods, U.S. manufacturers face the double-whammy of increased costs alongside reduced access to the Chinese market — the largest market for many US exporters. Moreover, it has been pointed out that Trump may have overestimated China’s dependence on the US market. The US market currently accounts for just 18% of China’s exports. More than 80% percent of China’s exports go elsewhere. The US no longer has the leverage to dictate trade terms to China.
Trump is acting not only on China. Claiming that the US has not benefited from free trade and has been taken advantage of by its trading partners, Trump is basically trying to dismantle the global free trade regime by disregarding WTO; walking away from new trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); putting on hold the US-EU Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP); and reneging on existing agreements such as the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Noting that “the US is one of the primary beneficiaries of the global economy” and that “the WTO and its predecessor GATT have been fundamental in ensuring open trade rules”, Professor Sharyn O’halloran of Columbia University regards Trump’s claim that the global free trade regime “has been unfair to the US and that the US has not benefited whatsoever” as one that is hard to support.
Trump’s rascally protectionist behaviours have prompted the rest of the world, led by EU, to act in unison to protect the global free trade regime. In July 2018, for example, EU and Japan signed the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) after nearly five years of negotiation. The agreement is reportedly the largest bilateral trade deal ever, encompassing a population of about 600 million people in 29 countries and accounting for roughly 30% of the world's GDP. As for its concerns over China’s unfair trade and investment practices, EU adopted a non-confrontation approach of conducting talks with China within the framework of WTO. At the same time, EU is stepping up efforts to renew or conclude new trade agreements with Canada, Mexico, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Chile, Indonesia, New Zealand, Tunisia, India, and Mercosur. Japan, on its part, has provided the leadership to conclude the 11-country Comprehensive and Progressive TTP without the participation of the US. Meanwhile, ASEAN is leading the way to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving the 10 ASEAN members and six other Asia Pacific countries namely, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Even though the idea was first introduced during the 19th ASEAN Summit in 2011, it was not until Trump's withdrawal from TPP in January 2017 that its chance of success became likely.
Instead of waging a high profile and impact Sino-US trade war, critics say that Trump’s efforts could have been better used to put its house in order to meet the emerging challenges from a China on the rise. Among other things, the US can review the working of the CFIUS to better vet Chinese investment into hi-tech sectors; uphold the existing international free trade regime by using WTO to present a case against Chinese industrial policies; rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which set high bars for intellectual property protection, labour standards, and safeguards against unfair competition from state-owned enterprises; and invest in education, infrastructure, and basic science to ensure the US maintains its competitive edge.
As Joseph Stiglitz posits in his writing “The US is at Risk of Losing a Trade War with China”, the US has a problem but it is more to do with too little saving at home than with China. Unless consumption levels and behaviours change, what the US will not buy from China has to be imported from somewhere else. Resorting to a trade war to solve an imbalance caused by bad spending habits at home may be good for political campaigning but makes poor economic sense.
China's Responses to the Trade War
At a 2017 Politburo meeting to discuss economic plans for 2018, the Chinese top leaders oozed confidence then that China, as the world’s economic engine, had the power to deal with its impending trade war with the US.
As events unfolded in 2018, however, Trump's full-frontal assaults on China's trade with the US is slowly but surely inflicting a toll on the Chinese economy which is on track to expand in 2018 at the slowest pace in almost three decades. The slowing economic activities are in part caused by declining investments attributable to the government's deleveraging efforts since 2016.
Without resorting to a big fiscal stimulus to prop up growth, optimism that the Chinese government could fight on two fronts — taming its heavy debt burden at the same time as taking on America — appeared to be dissipating.
In December 2018, both governments announced a 90-day truce during which negotiations will be attempted to arrive at a comprehensive agreement between the two countries. As parts of its peace offering, China not only announced that it would temporarily cancel an extra 25% import tariff on American cars (imposed in retaliation for American tariffs) and resume purchases of American soyabeans, but also indicated willingness to walk away from the “Made in China 2025” blueprint that aims to turn the country into an advanced manufacturing power. To downplay its significance, Chinese officials described it as a vague, aspirational document. References to it had all but vanished from state media and the government appeared ready to rescind it formally.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government also wanted to show that foreign companies play on a level field. Vice Premier Liu He was said to have asked the central bank to devise guidelines for how “competitive neutrality” would work in China. The idea, promoted by the OECD rich-country club, is that state-owned companies can form part of a healthy market economy provided they enjoy no special advantages. Even before this, China had already demonstrated its willingness to open its economy to foreign firms by allowing Tesla to be the first foreign carmaker to have a wholly owned manufacturing facility in China; UBS, a Swiss bank, to be the first foreign firm to be allowed a majority stake in a Chinese brokerage; and ExxonMobil to build a wholly owned petrochemical complex, which until recently foreign firms could not do. Moreover, China had also published tougher rules for protecting intellectual property, which foreign companies have long demanded.
One avenue Xi is pinning his hope on, not only to mitigate the adverse impacts of the trade war but also to lift China out of the middle-income gap, is the push of the private sector which is nimbler and more productive than its state-owned counterpart. China’s private sector today is responsible for 50% of tax revenue, 60% of the nation’s output, 70% of technological innovation, 80% of employment and 90% of new jobs. The sector's well-being will therefore have a great impact on the overall economy.
However, the government's crackdown on the shadow banking system has inflicted great pain on private businesses which traditionally have depended on the unofficial banking industry to finance their operations and growth. Lending has effectively dried up as a result of the clampdown causing shadow financing to shrink for an eighth straight month in October 2018 to the lowest since December 2016. At the same time, as the economy slowed, banks in the official sector became more reluctant to lend to smaller, often riskier companies. For rational business reasons, these banks prioritize lower-risk lending to state-owned companies backed by the government and with security of collateral that private companies often lack.
With funding drying up, corporate borrowers (almost all privately owned) defaulted on a record $6.6 billion of debt in the third quarter of 2018. The high default rate pushed up interest rates on private company bonds, exacerbating the squeeze. Capping it all are the higher tariffs, and greater uncertainty, caused by the trade war with the US. That’s hitting private, export-dependent companies harder than state enterprises.
Slowing pace of growth of outstanding loans to small companies
To underline the significance of private business in the nominally Communist country at a time when the economy is under pressure, President Xi has put his personal stamp on driving growth in the private sector by proclaiming “unwavering” support for the private businesses. Xi’s pledge is quickly followed by promises from Premier Li Keqiang, central bank Governor Yi Gang, banking and insurance chief Guo Shuqing, and Vice Premier Liu. Their unequivocal assurance to help private businesses have made it politically correct for banks “to give private companies a break” such that not lending to the riskier SMEs hereon may be judged as being uncooperative. At the same time, to translate its promises into actions, the Chinese government implemented several moves to loosen lending conditions.
In October 2018, for example, the central bank announced plans to give 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) to China Bond Insurance Co. (CBIC) to provide credit support for debt sales by private enterprises. CBIC provides guarantees for notes sold by SMEs, and also provides insurance for bonds sold by such issuers, similar to credit default swaps. According to a 2017 rule from the State Council, companies that guarantee bonds sold in China are able to provide assurances of up to 10 times their current net assets, or 15 times for guarantee companies that mainly serve small and rural borrowers.
In a separate move, the central bank also announced a 150 billion-yuan ($22 billion) increase in its re-lending and re-discounting quota. These are tools that allow the central bank to supply financial institutions with money to lend. The quota was also raised by 150 billion yuan in June.
"No One can Dictate China's Economic Development Path"
Meanwhile, in the face of mounting challenge from the US, China is demonstrating in no uncertain terms that it is no pushover.
In a speech given on 18 December 2018 marking 40 years of its historic "reform and opening up" policy amid a stern challenge from the US, President Xi Jinping vowed to press ahead with economic reforms to further open up the domestic market but made clear that Beijing will not deviate from its one-party system or take orders from any other country.
In reference to Chinese geopolitical ambitions, Xi asserted that China would “actively promote the construction of an open world economy, build a community of human destiny, promote the transformation of the global governance system, clearly oppose hegemonism and power politics."
He further warned that no one could "dictate" China's economic development path as the country was “increasingly approaching the centre of the world stage and becoming a recognized builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order."
Moreover, Xi used the occasion to reiterate the need for the Communist Party to exercise leadership and control over all aspects of the country’s development and that reforms must be based on the overarching goal of improving and developing the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. While he reaffirmed that the CCP “will resolutely reform what should or can be changed”, he also reasserted that CCP “will never reform what cannot be changed.”
Naturally, Xi's strong words prompted many American media outlets to run alarmist headlines. Analysts, though, are were quick to point out that the likely audience Xi was speaking to are Chinese, not American decision-makers.
PREVIOUS: 1.05 Leveraging on the Internet for Growth II - Made in China 2025
 See Qualcomm Press Announcements. (2018). “Qualcomm and Baidu PaddlePaddle Work Together on Exploring On-Device AI Applications.” 23 May, 2018.
 See Scott Kennedy. (2015). “Made in China 2025.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. 1 June, 2015.
 See Bloomberg. (2018). “How ‘Made in China 2025’ Frames Trump's Trade Threats.” 10 April, 2018.
 See SupChina. (2018). “Made In China 2025: The Domestic Tech Plan That Sparked An International Backlash.” 28 June, 2018.
 See Lorand Laskai. (2018). “Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025?” Council on Foreign Relations. 28 March, 2018.
 See Andrea Shalal. (2018). “Germany risks losing key technology in Chinese takeovers - spy chief.” Reuters. 11 April, 2018.
 See Kagan Pittman. (2016). “It’s Happened: KUKA Is Now Chinese Owned.” Engineering.com. 18 July, 2018.
 See Echo Huang. (2017). “Chinese investment in the US skyrocketed last year.” Quartz. 3 January, 2017.
 See Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh. (2018). “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). January 2018. Pg 3.
 See Bloomberg. (2018). “How ‘Made in China 2025’ Frames Trump's Trade Threats.” 10 April, 2018; See Lorand Laskai. (2018).
 See Patti Domm. (2018). “US could target 10 Chinese industries, including new-energy vehicles, biopharma.” CNBC. 22 March, 2018.
 See Matt Sheehan. (2018). “Trump’s Trade War Isn’t About Trade, It’s About Technology.” Macropolo. 3 April, 2018.
 See Jost Wübbeke, Mirjam Meissner et. al. (2016). “MADE IN CHINA 2025: The making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial countries.” Mercator Institute of China Studies. No 2. December 2016. Pg 7.
 See Eunice Yoon. (2018). “Chinese President Xi’s business forum speech: The take from Beijing.” CNBC. 10 April, 2018.
 See Kristen Hopewell. (2018). “What is ‘Made in China 2025’ — and why is it a threat to Trump’s trade goals?” Washington Post. 3 May 2018.
 See Ankit Panda. (2018). “Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement.” The Diplomat. 18 July, 2018.
 See 中天新闻.(2018). “文茜世界財經週報”. 22 July, 2018.
 See Bloomberg. (2018). “How ‘Made in China 2025’ Frames Trump's Trade Threats.” 10 April, 2018.