PREVIOUS | NEXT
Rising Inequality due to Influx of Foreign Workers & Talents
After every round of economy restructuring, some will be left behind inevitably due to skill obsolescence. Those who could be retrained were redeployed to high value-add emerging sectors but many usually ended up in domestic services sector earning lower pay. Over time, wage disparity inexorably widened due to the incessant economic restructuring.
1 January 2011
As we can see from the evolution of Singapore’s economy since its independence, other than the four short recessions which was primarily caused by either slowdown in global demand or external financial crises, the city-state chalked up impressive growth with the economy expanding on an average of about 8% annually.
On the flip side, however, the incessant need to move up the value-add ladder to keep ahead of competition posed a great demand on its lean labour force to upgrade its skills and knowledge continuously.
To be sure, human resource has been a binding constraint that limits economic growth since as early as the 1970s. The problem is not only the small size of the population. When the labour force was young and adaptable in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, new skills could be assimilated quickly. However, as the population continues to age after the turn of the century, upgrading has become increasingly tedious not to mention that new skills required were also more complex than in yesteryears.
Inadvertently, the incessant restructuring produced winners and losers. In time, more and more older workers faced dislocation due to skill obsolescence. This mismatch in supply and demand of skill sets as the economy moves up the value ladder resulted not only in more structural unemployment but also increasing dependence on foreign talent with the skill sets for emerging high-growth economic sectors.
Emergence of a Two-Speed Dual Economy
By the 1990s, as a result of the interminable process of economic restructuring, a divergent pattern of growth had emerged, culminating in the emergence of a two-speed dual-track economy comprising of the “global periphery” and the “domestic core”. 
The faster “global periphery” track is made up of workers and large businesses (mostly MNCs) serving predominantly regional and global clients involved in subsectors like offshore finance, private banking, asset management, high-end residential market, marine and aviation transport services and equipment, and pharmaceutical products. This segment has not only been able to benefit directly from the recovery of global demand, it also enjoys favourable policies offered by the government to entice foreign investments. Given that a higher level of skills and international exposure are needed to carry out activities in this segment, the number of foreigners and permanent residents here is significantly larger than the national average. Because of the high value-add nature of the activities, the workers in this segment command higher wages and the segment as a whole accounts for a disproportionately larger share of the total GDP even though it employs less than a quarter of the labour force.
In contrast to the “global periphery” track’s external orientation, the slower growth “domestic core” track is comprised of businesses and workers serving the domestic market. Their activities cover subsectors including retail trades, construction, the mass residential market, catering trade, transport, public services (e.g. health care), hotels and restaurants, and domestic Singdollar financial activities (e.g. retail banking). In other words, growth of this track depends directly on the state of the domestic economy. Most of the workers in this track are either Singaporeans or unskilled foreign workers. Because the activities have lower value-add, workers here command lower wages than those in the “global periphery” track. The presence of foreign workers willing to work at low wages further depresses wage growth for Singapore workers. Hence, even though the domestic track employs about three-quarters of the total labour force in Singapore, it accounts for a disproportionately smaller share of the country’s overall GDP.
The emergence of the two-speed dual-track economy also complicates policymakers’ efforts to drive productivity growth. Generally, companies in the global periphery track are mostly MNCs and large local firms (predominantly the GLCs). They are more capital intensive and hence productive. In contrast, the SMEs, in particular those in the construction, retail, and hospitality industries, either have no incentives and resources to upgrade or do not have the knowledge to redesign their work processes to increase the productivity of their workers. The productivity level of the construction industry in Singapore, for example, is estimated to be only one-third that of Japan’s and half that of Australia’s.
The productivity gap between the foreign and the local companies in Singapore is also evident in the falling contribution to GDP by the latter. The share of GDP contributed by resident companies and workers declined from about two-thirds in 1998 to about 54.3% in 2008. In terms of contribution to GDP growth, the figures are even more worrying. In 2004, residents contributed slightly more than half of GDP growth. That figure fell to less than a third by 2008. Finally, while the overall per capita GDP was S$53,192, the resident per capita GDP reached only S$38,372.
Similarly, at the firm level, profit margin is comparatively lower in the domestic core track because of high domestic competition and because their prohibitive size excludes them from reaping any benefits from long term investments for economies of scale. Finally, at the industry level, while the global periphery track’s activities enjoy high growth as a result of rising opportunities in regional and global markets, the domestic core segment’s activities remain sluggish because of people’s habits of high saving and low consumption.
Rising Inequality in the Two-Speed Dual Economy
The net effect of the two-speed dual-track economy is the widening of the wage differentials between workers in the two tracks over the years. The trend of rising income inequality became increasingly noticeable after the Asian Financial Crisis. Even though there was an increase in mean income and that social welfare has increased in terms of better education, healthcare and overall standard of living, Gini coefficient rose from 0.44 in 1990, 1995 and 1997 to 0.45 in 1998 and 0.47 in 1999.  Another study by Chia and Chen (2003) arrived also at similar conclusion. They found that, contrary to Kuznets’ prediction, ratios of the top to bottom quintiles of households by income from work fell from 14.4 in 1980 to 11.4 in 1990 but rose again to an even higher level of 20.9 in 2000, showing that income inequality improved initially (i.e. Gini coefficient fell) in the 1980s but deteriorated significantly (i.e. Gini coefficient rose) in the 1990s. By 2000, the workers were in fact worse off in terms of wage growth.
[About Kuznets’ Hypothesis] Kuznets’ hypothesis posits that as development proceeds and mean income grows, inequality in income distribution first increases and then decreases, producing an inverse-U shape Gini coefficient curve.
After the turn of the century, even though the economy as a whole registered impressive growth, in particular after 2004, the unequal distribution of income persisted. While headline GDP grew 6.4% in 2005 and 10.6% in 2006, domestic demand expanded only by 3.3% and 4.9% for the two periods respectively. Again, the disproportionate growth in the two tracks showed up in the growth of household income. While the higher income groups saw their income grow 2.8% annually between 2000 – 2005, the lower income groups suffered income contraction. The 11th to 20th income decile group saw an annual 4.3% fall in average household income, while the 21st to 30th income decile group saw a 0.5% decline. Consequently, between 2000 and 2007, the Singapore’s Gini coefficient climbed from 0.444 to a high of 0.489. It moderated to 0.481 in 2008 and 0.478 in 2009 only because of the financial crisis (See Figure 3).
 See Figure 1 for the various phases of Singapore’s economic development and the government’s efforts in upgrading the economy.
 See Chua H.B. (2006).
 Straits Times. “What ails Singapore’s building industry?” March 13, 2010
 Straits Times. “Go for Goldilocks Growth.” January 23, 2010
 See Singapore Department of Statistics (2000) and Mukhopadhaya (2001).
 See Kuznets (1955).
 See Chia and Chen (2003) for a summary of various studies conducted by different economists on how income distribution in Singapore changes at different phases of economic development.
 See Chua H.B. (2006).
 See Singapore Department of Statistics. (2006)
 Straits Times. “A Global, Vibrant Singapore.” December 31, 2009.